@co-hoosier Obama's mistakes don't come close to Bush's. Invading Iraq was as big a blunder as we've had. And Obama can't make the mistakes he made if we hadn't already unleashed Isis in the region.
Bush’s Iraq Blunder was serious and acute. Obama’s Iran blunder has created a chronic condition.
Bush's blunder was because of faulty intelligence, not because of a flawed foreign policy.
In light of 9/11, it's understandable why the intelligence community erred the way it did.
What did Iraq have to do with 9/11?
@co-hoosier Obama's mistakes don't come close to Bush's. Invading Iraq was as big a blunder as we've had. And Obama can't make the mistakes he made if we hadn't already unleashed Isis in the region.
Bush’s Iraq Blunder was serious and acute. Obama’s Iran blunder has created a chronic condition.
Bush's blunder was because of faulty intelligence, not because of a flawed foreign policy.
In light of 9/11, it's understandable why the intelligence community erred the way it did.
What did Iraq have to do with 9/11?
Axis of evil. It was presumed, at the time, that Saddam was in on it and intelligence agencies were out to prove it.
Confirmation bias.
Bush went with the Intel he was given.
DANC
@old-crescent Hard disagree. We had no intelligence linking Iraq to 9/11. That was a war of choice, not necessity. WMDs were only part of the justification. Bush also sold it on nation building and giving the Iraqis a prosperous democracy that would change the entire Middle East. The US spent trillions on a failed effort.
@old-crescent It didn't take long, at all, for the Taliban and Bin Laden to be given credit for 9/11. And their connection with Iraq was via the thinnest of threads. Iraq was an "easier" war, than marching in to the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. I think GWB is generally a very good man, but it doesn't take too much of a leap to think that political capital was a primary driver in his war against Iraq.
@old-crescent Hard disagree. We had no intelligence linking Iraq to 9/11. That was a war of choice, not necessity. WMDs were only part of the justification. Bush also sold it on nation building and giving the Iraqis a prosperous democracy that would change the entire Middle East. The US spent trillions on a failed effort.
Im not saying they weren’t wrong. I’m telling you what our intelligence agencies were telling Bush.
its easy to see things after the fact. As President, would you take the chance of a mass casualty event when Saddam was being coy and playing games with inspectors?
DANC
@old-crescent It didn't take long, at all, for the Taliban and Bin Laden to be given credit for 9/11. And their connection with Iraq was via the thinnest of threads. Iraq was an "easier" war, than marching in to the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. I think GWB is generally a very good man, but it doesn't take too much of a leap to think that political capital was a primary driver in his war against Iraq.
iraq easier than Afghanistan? No. And some seriously questioned whether we could beat the Iraqi army.
we didn’t go into Afghanistan with a large Army. We went in with CIA and Special Forces.
DANC
ChatGBT on this
At the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the U.S. intelligence community—primarily the CIA, DIA, and other agencies—believed several key things about Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These beliefs were central to the Bush administration’s justification for going to war.
Here’s a summary of the main beliefs held by U.S. intelligence at the time:
🔴 1.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
- Belief: Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was actively pursuing nuclear weapons.
- Key claims:
- Iraq had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons (like anthrax, VX, and sarin).
- Saddam had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program.
- Iraq was actively hiding WMDs from UN inspectors.
- Reality: These claims were later found to be false. Post-invasion investigations (like the Iraq Survey Group’s 2004 report) concluded Iraq had no active WMD programs and had largely dismantled them in the 1990s.
🟡 2.
Links to Terrorism / al-Qaeda
- Belief: Iraq had ties to al-Qaeda and could potentially supply terrorists with WMDs.
- Key claims:
- Saddam Hussein had operational links to al-Qaeda.
- Iraq might pass WMDs to terrorist groups.
- Reality: No substantial operational ties were found. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) concluded there was no collaborative relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
🔵 3.
Defiance of UN Resolutions
- Belief: Saddam was in material breach of UN Security Council resolutions, particularly UNSCR 1441, which demanded full disarmament.
- Key claims:
- Iraq was not cooperating fully with UN weapons inspectors (UNMOVIC).
- Saddam’s regime was playing a cat-and-mouse game with the international community.
🟢 4.
Internal Repression and Human Rights Abuses
- Belief: Saddam’s regime was brutally repressive and posed a threat to regional stability.
- This was true. The Iraqi government had a record of mass killings, torture, and suppression, particularly against Kurds and Shia populations.
📜 Key Documents and Statements
- CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) – October 2002:
- Titled “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction”, this was a key document used to brief policymakers.
- It stated that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and was reconstituting its nuclear program.
- Later revealed to be deeply flawed and based on weak or misinterpreted evidence.
- Secretary of State Colin Powell’s UN Speech (February 2003):
- Presented satellite images, intercepted communications, and other claims to the UN Security Council.
- Powell later called this speech a “blot” on his record after many of the claims were discredited.
🧠 In Retrospect
Multiple official reviews (e.g., Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Prewar Intelligence, Robb-Silberman Commission) concluded that:
- U.S. intelligence was wrong in most of its key judgments about Iraq’s WMD programs.
- There was groupthink, pressure to conform, and limited human intelligence inside Iraq.
- Political pressure may have influenced how intelligence was interpreted and presented, though not necessarily the core intelligence itself.
Let me know if you’d like specific quotes from these reports or more about how the intelligence failures happened.
@old-crescent I don't think the intelligence agencies were telling Bush that Iraq had a hand in 9/11. Even if he was trying to get a WMD, why invade? Hell, why think he'd use a WMD against the US as a leader of a nation state that we could easily topple? Hussein wasn't a religious zealot.
@old-crescent Yes... many knew it at the time... history has proven it to be true. Afghanistan and Pakistan present nearly "unwinnable" conditions. Iraq, we were barely over a decade removed from beating them like we did Purdue last fall 66-0. Very comfortable way to "fight terrorism". But also very unnecessary, and VERY expensive.
@co-hoosier No links between Iraq and Al Queda, let alone 9/11.
-
Initial Intelligence Assessment:Within days of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. intelligence community concluded there was no credible information to link Saddam Hussein or Iraq to the attacks or al-Qaeda.
-
Bush Administration Statements:Despite this assessment, the Bush administration repeatedly made statements suggesting a connection between Hussein and terrorism, and specifically, a link to 9/11.
-
Public Perception:These statements, coupled with the overall climate of fear and anger following the attacks, led many Americans to believe that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11.
-
Retraction and Clarification:Later, Bush administration officials, including President Bush himself, clarified that there was no evidence of a direct link between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 attacks.
-
Debate and Criticism:Despite these retractions, questions remain about the extent to which the Bush administration deliberately misled the public about Iraq's ties to terrorism and the 9/11 attacks.
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/17/politics/us-has-no-evidence-linking-hussein-to-911-bush-says.html
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/03/14/a-look-back-at-how-fear-and-false-beliefs-bolstered-u-s-public-support-for-war-in-iraq/#:~:text=Two%20of%20the%20administratio n's%20arguments,on%20a%20foundation%20of%20falsehoods.
@co-hoosier No links between Iraq and Al Queda, let alone 9/11.
Search Labs | AI OverviewNo, U.S. intelligence agencies did not inform President George W. Bush that Saddam Hussein was linked to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In fact, intelligence assessments at the time indicated there was no credible information connecting the attacks to Iraq or Saddam Hussein.
Despite this, the Bush administration did make public statements and insinuations that suggested a link between Hussein and the 9/11 attacks, which contributed to the public's belief that such a connection existed.
Here's a more detailed breakdown:
Initial Intelligence Assessment:Within days of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. intelligence community concluded there was no credible information to link Saddam Hussein or Iraq to the attacks or al-Qaeda.
Bush Administration Statements:Despite this assessment, the Bush administration repeatedly made statements suggesting a connection between Hussein and terrorism, and specifically, a link to 9/11.
Public Perception:These statements, coupled with the overall climate of fear and anger following the attacks, led many Americans to believe that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11.
Retraction and Clarification:Later, Bush administration officials, including President Bush himself, clarified that there was no evidence of a direct link between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 attacks.
Debate and Criticism:Despite these retractions, questions remain about the extent to which the Bush administration deliberately misled the public about Iraq's ties to terrorism and the 9/11 attacks.https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/03/14/a-look-back-at-how-fear-and-false-beliefs-bolstered-u-s-public-support-for-war-in-iraq/#:~:text=Two%20of%20the%20administratio n's%20arguments,on%20a%20foundation%20of%20falsehoods.
AI and NYTimes?
You’re better than that.
DANC
ChatGBT on this
At the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the U.S. intelligence community—primarily the CIA, DIA, and other agencies—believed several key things about Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These beliefs were central to the Bush administration’s justification for going to war.
Here’s a summary of the main beliefs held by U.S. intelligence at the time:
🔴 1.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
- Belief: Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was actively pursuing nuclear weapons.
- Key claims:
- Iraq had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons (like anthrax, VX, and sarin).
- Saddam had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program.
- Iraq was actively hiding WMDs from UN inspectors.
- Reality: These claims were later found to be false. Post-invasion investigations (like the Iraq Survey Group’s 2004 report) concluded Iraq had no active WMD programs and had largely dismantled them in the 1990s.
🟡 2.
Links to Terrorism / al-Qaeda
- Belief: Iraq had ties to al-Qaeda and could potentially supply terrorists with WMDs.
- Key claims:
- Saddam Hussein had operational links to al-Qaeda.
- Iraq might pass WMDs to terrorist groups.
- Reality: No substantial operational ties were found. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) concluded there was no collaborative relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
🔵 3.
Defiance of UN Resolutions
- Belief: Saddam was in material breach of UN Security Council resolutions, particularly UNSCR 1441, which demanded full disarmament.
- Key claims:
- Iraq was not cooperating fully with UN weapons inspectors (UNMOVIC).
- Saddam’s regime was playing a cat-and-mouse game with the international community.
🟢 4.
Internal Repression and Human Rights Abuses
- Belief: Saddam’s regime was brutally repressive and posed a threat to regional stability.
- This was true. The Iraqi government had a record of mass killings, torture, and suppression, particularly against Kurds and Shia populations.
📜 Key Documents and Statements
- CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) – October 2002:
- Titled “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction”, this was a key document used to brief policymakers.
- It stated that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and was reconstituting its nuclear program.
- Later revealed to be deeply flawed and based on weak or misinterpreted evidence.
- Secretary of State Colin Powell’s UN Speech (February 2003):
- Presented satellite images, intercepted communications, and other claims to the UN Security Council.
- Powell later called this speech a “blot” on his record after many of the claims were discredited.
🧠 In Retrospect
Multiple official reviews (e.g., Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Prewar Intelligence, Robb-Silberman Commission) concluded that:
- U.S. intelligence was wrong in most of its key judgments about Iraq’s WMD programs.
- There was groupthink, pressure to conform, and limited human intelligence inside Iraq.
- Political pressure may have influenced how intelligence was interpreted and presented, though not necessarily the core intelligence itself.
Let me know if you’d like specific quotes from these reports or more about how the intelligence failures happened.
Brad, I will discuss with a person - not Chat GPT
DANC
@old-crescent I don't think the intelligence agencies were telling Bush that Iraq had a hand in 9/11. Even if he was trying to get a WMD, why invade? Hell, why think he'd use a WMD against the US as a leader of a nation state that we could easily topple? Hussein wasn't a religious zealot.
why invade? Why did we bomb Iran?
DANC
would never be reported as such but the US toppling Saddam was also meant as a clear message to the Middle East that any future 9/11s would end in regime change for involved governments. Saudi Arabia included.
@old-crescent Do you think the NYT misquoted Bush in September of 2003 saying there was no evidence linking Iraq to 9/11? If so, I can find another news source.
I posted AI because CoH did.
Again, the intelligence agencies did not tell Bush that Iraq played a part in 9/11 because as Bush admitted, there was no evidence of that.


